




Autonomous vehicles – who will be liable for 
accidents?  





This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License                  Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 15 (2018) | 33 
The attraction of autonomous vehicles  
 
In the last five years, there has been increasing 
enthusiasm for autonomous (i.e. self-driving, or 
driving by software) vehicles. There are many benefits 
claimed for them: lower energy demand, better use of 
infrastructure, fewer accidents and mobility for all, 
including those who, for reasons of age or infirmity, 
are unable to drive. A report by consultants KPMG1 
concluded that the adoption of autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) could add more than £50 billion per annum to 
Britain’s Gross Domestic Product by 2030. Connected 
AVs (i.e. autonomous vehicles that can communicate 
with each other and with the fixed infrastructure or 
both) are being researched or developed by major 
technology and car companies. The work is being 
supported by many governments, and has been 
reviewed by the UK House of Lords.2 In November 
2017 the UK Chancellor, Philip Hammond, told the 
BBC Today programme: ‘It will happen, I can promise 
you. It is happening already ... It is going to 
revolutionise our lives, it is going to revolutionise the 
way we work.’3 
A change from road transport based on vehicles under 
the control of identifiable on-board drivers to a 
situation where vehicles may be controlled by 
computer systems developed and managed by 
complex international industrial organisations is 
radical. This paper raises some of the issues of legal 
liability that might arise. 
The paper does not discuss the wider political and 
social issues raised by the widespread introduction on 
autonomous vehicles. In passing, it can be noted that, 
for 100 years, the car has been ‘sold’ as a symbol of 
personal freedom; moving to a situation where every 
journey is managed and logged by an international 
corporation would be a dramatic shift. The paper also 
                                                          
1 Connected and Autonomous Vehicles – The UK Economic 
Opportunity (March 2015, kpmg.co.uk). 
2 Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: The future?, House of Lords 
Science and Technology Select Committee, 2nd Report of Session 
2016–17, HL Paper 115. 
3 Gwyn Topham, ‘Philip Hammond pledges driverless cars by 2021 
and warns people to retrain’, The Guardian, 23 November 2017. 
excludes issues of energy consumption, traffic 
congestion and effects on public transport. These are 
all important questions that will need to be debated 
before countries become irrevocably committed to 
AVs. 
How is autonomous defined?  
 
Internationally, very similar definitions are used for 
levels of autonomous operation: 
 
Level 0 is the default situation today (Level 0 
has no automatic capability – it provides 
indications, but there is no connection to 
anything that can control the speed or 
steering of a car); sensors can provide lane-
departure warnings, electronic stability 
control, collision warnings, parking assistance, 
speed limit reminders, satellite navigation and 
many other advisory functions. Under close 
driver supervision, some of these sensors can 
be used to manage ‘hands off’ parallel parking 
or adaptive cruise control. This is classed as 
Level 1. 
By integrating adaptive cruise control and 
lane departure warnings into the control 
system, a Level 2 system can manage steady 
state driving on a clearly defined route, such 
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as a motorway, or inching forward in a traffic 
jam.4 
In the next stage of automation, Level 3, the 
driver can leave driving to the vehicle 
software, but has to be ready to take over if 
or when it decides it cannot continue. 
In Level 4 the system can manage driving in 
known conditions (such as in specified urban 
areas when there is no snow on the ground). 
Finally, in Level 5, the vehicle can undertake 
end-to-end driving anywhere and under all 
conditions. 
The benefits of AVs really only come into their own in 
Levels 4 and 5. In the lower levels, a competent driver 
has to be available in the vehicle at all times. Vehicles 
in these categories are therefore not suitable for 
providing mobility to the elderly or others who are 
not able and authorised to drive themselves. 
Different evolutionary routes  
 
If the end objective is the widespread adoption of 
self-driving cars, there are various routes to achieving 
this aim. Some developers, such as Waymo (with 
Google, part of the Alphabet Group), are 
concentrating on vehicles that incorporate a highly 
detailed three-dimensional map of the area of 
operation, accurate to a few centimetres. Each time a 
vehicle goes over a route, it can update its internal 
map and a fleet of similar vehicles can share their 
mapping knowledge. 
Knowing, with great accuracy, the fixed environment 
in which they are operating, makes it easier for the 
vehicles to differentiate between the background and 
unexpected objects such as pedestrians or other 
vehicles. The limitation of this approach is that the 
AVs can only operate in a closely specified geographic 
area which has recently been mapped in fine detail. 
However, a major benefit, relevant to the subject of 
this paper, is that the vehicles rely only on their 
internal maps and there is no supply chain of 
providers of safety-critical mapping information or 
other data. 
An alternative option being pursued by some car 
companies such as Tesla, is to design an AV that can 
                                                          
4 This was the situation for the Tesla Model S 70D car involved in an 
accident with an HGV in Florida on 7 May 2016. It was operating 
with ‘traffic-aware cruise control’ (TACC), which controlled its 
forward movement and ‘Autosteer’ which kept the vehicle within lane 
markings. 
scan the road ahead and plot a safe course, thus 
requiring only a basic internal map. This requires 
more sophisticated sensors and software but has the 
benefit that the vehicle is not constrained to a limited 
geographical area for which highly detailed and up-to-
date mapping data are available. At least in theory, 
this type of AV could drive safely anywhere it had the 
equivalent of a satnav map and would be able to 
respond appropriately to diversions, road works and 
other disruptions. 
Some of the claimed benefits of autonomous vehicles 
only become available when vehicles communicate 
with each other or with the fixed infrastructure. 
Convoys of cars, travelling with less than the Highway 
Code ‘safe braking distance’ between them are 
envisaged. This is claimed to be possible because 
following cars will receive information on what the 
lead car is intending to do, rather than waiting until its 
radar senses what the car in front is actually doing, as 
happens today with adaptive cruise control. 
Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) pose 
particular problems of responsibility and liability, 
discussed later in this paper. (It should be noted that 
connected vehicles can only achieve many of the 
benefits of AVs identified by the UK government, such 
as increasing motorway capacity.) 
If some CAVs are planned to have vehicle-to-vehicle 
(V2V) communication, other plans are for vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) interactions. For many years, the 
rail industry has used junction optimisation software 
to schedule trains on conflicting movements through 
junctions to minimise the overall delay. A similar type 
of system could be installed at roundabouts or traffic 
lights used by CAVs. As with V2V communication, this 
raises complex issues of safety responsibility, which is 
why some car manufacturers are not keen on the 
idea. 
Ownership models  
For conventional cars, there have been international 
requirements appertaining to both the manufacturer 
and the driver for many years – the earliest being the 
International Convention on Motor Traffic concluded 
in Paris in October 1909. More recently, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
has established conventions that require countries to 
adopt non-conflicting standards on such issues as 
certification of drivers, approval of motor vehicles and 
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road signage. The most relevant is the 1968 Vienna 
Convention (as amended).5 Article 8 states: 
1. Every moving vehicle or combination of 
vehicles shall have a driver. 
2. [not relevant – concerns animals] 
3. Every driver shall possess the necessary 
physical and mental ability and be in a fit 
physical and mental condition to drive. 
4. Every driver of a power-driven vehicle shall 
possess the knowledge and skill necessary for 
driving the vehicle; however, this requirement 
shall not be a bar to driving practice by 
learner drivers in conformity with domestic 
legislation. 
5. Every driver shall at all times be able to 
control his vehicle or to guide his animals. 
Annex 5 covers Technical Conditions Concerning 
Motor Vehicles and Trailers. This lists various 
requirements for vehicles including braking and 
lighting. The Convention is written on the basis that 
the vehicle has to meet defined standards and that 
safety, in operation, is the responsibility of the driver. 
AVs of Level 3 and below will have a driver compliant 
with Article 8. AVs of Levels 4 and 5 do not have a 
driver and thus there is a question over who carries 
the responsibility that would otherwise be the 
driver’s. 
Prototype running of AVs is being undertaken by the 
manufacturers of AV systems – generally large 
automotive or technology companies. They carry both 
the responsibilities of the manufacturer of the 
vehicles and also those of the driver, so it does not 
matter where the boundary between the two lies. 
Responsibilities becomes less well defined if AVs are 
leased or sold, either to companies, such as delivery 
contractors or taxi firms, or to individuals. These 
companies or individuals then become the operators 
of the vehicles (a term used later in this paper). They 
(or their employees) cannot be classed as drivers but 
they do not have the competence of manufacturers to 
ensure the safety of the automated systems. 
Ownership models for the future use of AVs are 
important. Without a driver, responsibility for safe 
operation must rest with an operator competent to 
discharge that responsibility. This may place 
                                                          
5 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 
Convention on Road Traffic, Vienna, November 1968. 
limitations on the ability of companies or individuals 
to own or lease AVs. A road traffic system in which all 
vehicles are owned and/or operated by an oligopoly 
of large industrial groups (mainly based in the USA) 
would be very different to that we know today. 
Who will drive the Queen?  
 
In a recent book,6 Christian Wolmar opens a 
discussion on the interoperability of AVs with other 
traffic by posing the question that forms the title of 
this section. It seems highly unlikely that presidential 
motorcades, royal transport, ministerial cars and 
other VIP transport will ever be controlled by 
software. To these can be added some emergency 
services, breakdown trucks, motorcycles and vehicles 
used for trades that are incompatible with fully 
automatic operation. Basically, there will never be a 
situation where all vehicles are autonomous – AVs will 
always have to be interoperable with other manually-
controlled vehicles and non-motorised road users, 
such as pedestrians, cyclists, horse riders and, in rural 
areas, flocks of sheep. 
Although some commentators talk about an eventual 
high take-up of AVs, this is unlikely to happen quickly. 
For automation that relies on a detailed internal map, 
AVs will initially be limited to particular cities. AVs that 
do not rely on detailed internal mapping will be able 
to expand their areas of operation more rapidly. 
Although some ‘tech-friendly’ authorities may 
introduce changes to road layouts, signage and other 
infrastructure to accommodate AVs, it is unrealistic to 
expect all local authorities to bring their infrastructure 
up to that standard before AVs are widespread. The 
significance of this is that AVs will have to be 
developed to be interoperable with conventional 
traffic on existing roads; one cannot expect drivers to 
adopt their behaviour to accommodate AVs or for all 
local authorities to guarantee elimination of road 
features AVs find difficult. 
Level 5: the Florence test  
 
Level 5 means autonomous under all circumstances 
and that includes cities such as Florence (Firenze). The 
central area of the city is pedestrianized. But when 
delivering clients to their hotels, taxis are expected to 
navigate past tour groups, pavement cafés, horse-
drawn carriages, market traders, Segway scooters, in-
                                                          
6 Christian Wolmar, Driverless cars: on a road to nowhere (London 
Publishing Partnership, 2018). 
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line skaters, queues for bars and cafés snaking across 
the road, and groups of teenagers sitting on the kerbs 
and chatting. Away from the centre, the roads are 
more clearly delineated, but AVs will still have to 
coexist with horse-drawn carriages and, at the end of 
the day, market traders going home, at 5 km/h, with 
their folded-up, electrically-propelled stalls. 
In a Level 5 AV, the system carries out all driving 
functions under all conditions. While this may be 
reasonably straightforward in suburban California or 
newly-built urban areas such as Milton Keynes, one 
has to ask whether it is realistic in Florence or in rural 
Tuscany, the Hebrides or the Pyrenees. In winter, 
human drivers may have to navigate their vehicles 
through floods or on snow-covered roads with only 
minimal markings; many country roads have single-
track sections where drivers observe unwritten 
conventions about who goes first or who reverses 
back to a passing place; drivers of cars boarding 
ferries are expected to respond to traffic lights, hand 
signals or verbal instructions. 
To further complicate the situation, many sensors on 
present-day cars can be overcome by poor 
environmental conditions. Driving in winter, the front 
of a car can become covered by wet snow, leading to 
video cameras, proximity sensors and radar sensors 
reporting failure. On country roads, splattered mud 
can have a similar effect in any season. It would be 
over-optimistic to assume AVs would be immune to 
such problems. 
If a significant benefit of a Level 5 vehicle is that it 
provides autonomous mobility to people who are 
young, old or disabled, it has to be able to cope with 
whatever road traffic conditions it encounters; there 
is no option to hand over control when conditions 
become difficult. Realistically therefore, it seems 
improbable that fully autonomous Level 5 vehicles will 
be operational internationally within the foreseeable 
future. Level 4 vehicles, probably with control systems 
using detailed internal mapping and limited to a 
specific geographical area, are more likely but still 
very challenging. 
The progressive introduction of AVs could cause 
difficulties for some communities – particularly if the 
first applications are in taxi or home delivery services. 
For instance, would it be a denial of someone’s legal 
rights if taxi firms refuse to accept their address 
because it is outside a computer-mapped area? 
Design authorities and systems 
authorities 
There are two types of entity that can be seen to have 
responsibilities for AV safety – design authorities and 
systems authorities. For almost any engineering 
artefact, one can identify a design authority – usually 
the company that made it. In the aviation industry, 
separate design authorities can be identified for the 
airframe (e.g. Airbus), the engine (e.g. Rolls Royce) 
and the landing gear (e.g. Safran). In most cases, the 
liability for an accident caused by a mechanical or 
electrical failure can readily be allocated to one of 
these bodies. 
For road vehicles, the overall design authority is 
usually the manufacturer (such as Ford, JLR, or PSA). 
Where they have bought-in a complete subsystem, 
such as an engine management system on a 
subcontract, the subcontractor could be held liable for 
accidents caused by that subsystem. 
Complicated projects, comprising several subsystems 
all provided by different bodies, cannot readily be 
described as being the responsibility of a single design 
authority. When Lines 3 and 4 of the Seoul Metro 
were built in the 1980s, the operating company 
placed separate contracts for the trains (a UK 
company), the signalling (a US company), the power 
supply (a different US company) and the 
telecommunications (another US company). They 
then appointed one of these to undertake the 
systems engineering to ensure that all the various 
parts of the project could work together safely. Each 
of the different work packages had a design authority, 
so Union Switch and Signal were the Design Authority 
for the signalling system but a different company, GEC 
Transportation Projects, was the System Authority 
responsible for ensuring that the signalling was 
compatible with the power supplies and traction 
systems. 
A system authority, sometimes referred to as a 
system architect (SA), is needed when a system is 
undergoing change.7 The change could be the 
development of new activity, such as building a 
network of international space stations. Alternatively, 
                                                          
7 The word ‘system’ has many uses and definitions. In this paper, it 
is taken to mean the following: An organised structure that consists 
of interconnected and interdependent elements (often the 
responsibility of different organisations) built to achieve a defined 
objective. System elements can themselves be subsystems, each 
consisting of further sets of elements. Systems display emergent 
properties not seen in the individual elements. 
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it could involve an existing system being subjected to 
significant changes either to its objectives, the 
environment in which it operates or to the technology 
it uses. 
Developers of computer software refer to a V-diagram 
for software testing.8 A variation of this diagram can 
be used for defining the role of system architect: 
Figure 1: How a systems architect fits into project 
delivery 
Starting at the top left, the objectives of the system 
are defined. For instance, to restructure the accident 
and emergency (A&E) services in a region these might 
include: emergency service response times, waiting 
times in hospital, death rates, ability to cope with an 
epidemic, patient confidentiality, cost and so on. The 
objectives are defined as desired outcomes, not how 
those outcomes are achieved. 
The system architect (SA) body takes these objectives, 
analyses different options and produces a system 
architecture that will satisfy the outcomes. For the 
A&E example, the architect might analyse possible 
combinations of walk-in centres, computer-based 
diagnostics, regional hospitals, community nurses, 
mobile treatment centres and extended GP facilities. 
The SA’s outputs are recommendations of what 
facilities are needed and how they would interact. The 
design authorities for these facilities use the SA’s 
guidance when designing and building facilities. The 
right hand side of the diagram is about putting into 
service the various components of the system. At the 
top right the system objectives are delivered. 
Development of an electrically-powered autonomous 
transport system may need both a systems authority 
and various design authorities. The latter group could 
include mapping contactors, highways authorities 
responsible for the road network and road signals, 
                                                          
8 Ian Sommerville, Software Engineering (10th edn, Pearson, 2015). 
battery charging network contractors, vehicle builders 
and various control system suppliers. The systems 
authority would ensure that, when these groups are 
brought together, the end result is a functional and 
safe system. 
In manually-driven cars, drivers are held responsible 
for operational failures. If they drive too fast and 
overturn on a bend, or drive too close and cannot 
stop when a car in front indicates to turn across the 
oncoming traffic, they are liable. It is not an adequate 
defence to say that the road authority should have 
imposed a speed restriction on the bend or the 
preceding driver should not have wanted to make (an 
entirely legal) manoeuvre. 
The situation for an autonomous vehicle may be 
different. Some models of AV evolution assume safe 
operation will depend on accurate knowledge of the 
infrastructure, highly-detailed mapping and 
predictable operation of road signs and other 
indications, which places responsibilities on 
infrastructure managers which they may be unwilling 
to accept. For the present prototype AV trials, the 
major automotive and tech companies are acting as 
main contractors/operators who take responsibility 
for everything (and have made ex-gratia payments to 
those injured when things go wrong). This situation is 
unlikely to continue into full-scale, world-wide 
operations. While it may be technically 
straightforward, if resource-consuming, to maintain 
up-to-date maps at centimetre detail of the urban 
areas of Palo Alto, California or Phoenix, Arizona, it 
would be impracticable to maintain a similar standard 
of mapping of the network of minor roads in the north 
Pyrenees, on the Mull of Kintyre or of the many 
thousands of comparable locations in Europe, not 
least because many of the physical features near the 
roads are vegetation and are forever moving and 
changing. 
Thus the model of each manufacturer maintaining 
independent and detailed mapping of all routes over 
which their AVs may operate, becomes unrealistic for 
continent-wide Level 5 automation. At this scale, 
either AVs would have to be developed to be fully 
self-contained and able to operate safely on any road, 
anywhere, or there would be a need for collaboration 
between vehicle infrastructure providers, mapping 
agencies and other parties leading to ambiguity about 
overall responsibility for vehicle safety. 
Some types of AVs are likely to rely on 
communications links with the infrastructure. In 
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particular, CAVs (connected autonomous vehicles) 
could communicate with other vehicles – probably 
made by different companies – when running in 
convoys, and with ‘smart’ traffic signs. This implies 
that safe operation could depend on the correct 
functioning of data networks and the integrity of 
interfaces with road signalling and other vehicles. In 
this situation, an individual AV builder cannot be 
responsible for operation of the complete system and 
a systems authority will be needed. 
Who could be a systems authority for Connected 
Autonomous Vehicles?  
Making the assumption that connected autonomous 
vehicles (CAVs) are developed, as the UK government 
hopes, by 2040 there might be a dozen different 
manufacturers producing CAVs that operate across 
Europe. They would communicate with each other 
and with the fixed infrastructure and might take 
mapping data from a large number of different 
sources. Under these conditions, there would clearly 
be a need for a systems authority, but it is far from 
clear who or what this could be. One option, that 
might have been seriously considered 30 years ago, 
would be for national transport authorities – or even 
a department of the European Commission – to take 
this role, but that is unlikely in the present political 
climate. 
An important aspect of a systems authority would be 
to manage the interfaces between the different 
participants. For a comparison, it is instructive to look 
at the way the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is 
managed. [Note: this is not the internet itself, which 
refers to the connectivity between computers and 
systems.] W3C is the systems architect for the world-
wide web (www).9 It is an international community 
with about 400 (mainly institutional) members where 
a full-time staff and the public work together to 
develop web standards. W3C sees its mission as ‘to 
lead the Web to its full potential’. W3C is 
administered via a joint agreement among Host 
Institutions: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), the European Research Consortium for 
Informatics and Mathematics (ERCIM), Keio University 
in Minato, Tokyo and Beihang University (BUAA) in 
Beijing, China. The W3C staff (many of whom work 
physically at one of these institutions) are led by a 
Director and CEO. A small management team is 
responsible for resource allocation and strategic 
                                                          
9 The section is based on information from the W3C website. 
planning on behalf of the staff. Much of the work is 
done by the Advisory Committee, composed of one 
representative from each member, a Technical 
Architecture Group, which primarily seeks to 
document Web Architecture principles, and the 
chartered groups comprising Member representatives 
and invited experts, which produce most of W3C’s 
requirements, such as interface specifications. 
The Technical Architecture Group (TAG) undertakes 
the core systems architect role for W3C. The mission 
of the TAG is defined as stewardship of the Web 
architecture. There are three aspects to this mission: 
(i) to document and build consensus around 
principles of Web architecture and to 
interpret and clarify these principles when 
necessary; 
(ii) to resolve issues involving general Web 
architecture brought to the TAG; and 
(iii) to help coordinate cross-technology 
architecture developments inside and outside 
W3C. 
The primary activity of the TAG is to develop 
Architectural Recommendations. An Architectural 
Recommendation is one whose primary purpose is to 
set out fundamental principles that should be 
adhered to by all Web components. The nature of a 
digital communications system is that addressing has 
to be perfectly correct. Anyone who has mistyped a 
web address will be well aware that the likely 
outcome is a complete failure of communication. It is 
essential in a complex technical environment that 
standards are precise and detailed. The W3C website 
contains thousands of pages setting out what is 
acceptable and what is not acceptable in terms of the 
interface with other web users, much of it in great 
technical detail. 
The model adopted by W3C could cope with the 
complexity of the interface standards needed by 
CAVs, but W3C standards have never been applied to 
safety-critical systems. If a Web communication fails, 
the users probably curse, switch off, make a coffee, 
switch back on and try again. No-one will take legal 
action against the members of a committee for 
producing a set of specifications that, in certain 
unusual conditions, cause communication to be lost. 
However, the same degree of tolerance would not be 
shown if there is a failure of communications within a 
convoy of heavy trucks running at 100 km/h on a 
motorway. Faulty communication could result in a 
 
Autonomous vehicles – who will be liable for accidents?                                                                   vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 15 (2018) | 39 
 
massive pile-up with many fatalities and injuries. In 
such an event, the public would expect a formal 
inquiry, with the prosecution of anyone found to be at 
fault. The state cannot be seen to provide the AV 
industry with a waiver of the law.  
The railway industry has come to terms with the need 
for high-integrity systems engineering. Throughout 
most of the EU, trains operated by many different 
companies travel safely over infrastructure owned by 
various national organisations. The price of this 
interoperability and safety is a highly conservative and 
risk averse design and approval process. While convoy 
operation of CAVs is being considered as a way of 
operating road vehicles at much less than a braking 
distance apart, the railways have spent the last 30 
years slowly working towards a moving-block system 
that would reduce train separation to a braking 
distance (plus a margin) as opposed to the more 
conservative fixed-block signalling systems that have 
been operated since early last century. Software for 
railway signalling systems is simple and built using 
high-integrity design techniques. It is orders of 
magnitude simpler than the software structures being 
developed in the AV industry. 
As part of a review of the operation of the electrical 
supply system of Great Britain, a survey considered 
several systems architect models used by different 
industries.10 None of the industries surveyed in this 
report has a systems architect or system authority 
model suitable for the continent-wide adoption of 
autonomous vehicles. The lack of a system authority 
will not slow the initial development being 
undertaken by single companies in restricted 
geographical locations, but a model that manages 
safety, enables continent-wide operation, discourages 
monopolies, encourages competition and ensures 
clear accountability has not yet been identified. 
It is instructive to consider the attempt of the UK rail 
industry to establish a systems authority to cover the 
area of wheel-rail interfaces. On 17 October 2000, 
there was a major rail crash at Hatfield, Hertfordshire; 
four people were killed and 70 were injured. Initial 
investigations found that the rail fracturing had 
caused the accident, which lead to the train derailing. 
More detailed investigations determined the problem 
to be one of rolling-contact fatigue. A paper written 
                                                          
10 IET Expert Group: Power Network Joint Vision, Transforming the 
Electricity System: How other sectors have met the challenge of 
whole-system integration (Institution of Engineering and Technology, 
October 2014). 
several years prior to the accident had identified at 
least eight parameters that affect rolling contact 
fatigue – axle load, wheel diameter, wheel-rail contact 
profile, cant deficiency, flange lubrication, traction 
enhancers, rail material and heat treatment, rail 
installation, traction control system characteristics, 
operational timetable and primary suspension 
stiffness.11 
Railtrack were held liable for the Hatfield accident 
because their inspection regime had not picked-up 
initial stages of cracking. To avoid similar incidents in 
future, the industry decided to establish a systems 
authority including experts from all the parties who 
had influence over the factors that could lead to this 
type of fatigue. This included rail manufacturers, train 
operators, rolling-stock suppliers and infrastructure 
maintainers.12 None of these could solve the problem 
by themselves, but they could all contribute to a 
solution. However, establishing the committee was 
difficult and was eventually abandoned, as it was 
impossible for members to obtain professional liability 
insurance individually, and their employers were not 
prepared to carry the potential liability of having been 
party to a decision that could result in a major train 
crash. 
This is significant issue for the development of CAVs. 
While AV development activities are restricted to 
trials operated by a single company large enough to 
carry any potential liability, there are no issues of 
divided responsibilities. However, a mature AV 
industry with several manufacturers producing 
vehicles that communicate between themselves, 
relying on a plethora of partners for the 
infrastructure, requires a degree of coordination that 
can only be provided by a systems authority of some 
sort, and it is difficult to see what grouping of 
organisations would take on that role. 
Are maps safety-critical?  
An autonomous vehicle views the world through a 
wide variety of sensors. It has radars that measure 
distance to the next car, cameras that take in colour 
images of the street, and its Lidar sensors send out 
laser pulses that gauge the surroundings. Unlike a 
human driver, who takes-in the environment during 
the journey and, at most, needs a map with the level 
                                                          
11 A. F. Bower and K. L. Johnson, ‘Plastic flow and shakedown of rail 
surface in repeated wheel rail contact’, Wear, Volume 144, Issues 1-
2, 1991, 1 – 18. 
12 The author represented the rolling stock manufacturing sector on 
this group. 
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of detail of a road atlas, some current AVs need a 
three-dimensional representation of the environment 
around it that is updated continuously and is accurate 
down to a few centimetres. 
During a day’s driving, an AV with a built-in detailed 
map can collect more than a terabyte (1 TB) of data 
(roughly the total capacity of a laptop hard drive). 
With that much detailed information coming from the 
car’s many sensors, a fleet of cars operating in a city 
would amass a massive amount of information that 
can be used to provide more accurate mapping so the 
fleet continually updates its three dimension (3D) 
‘map’ of the city. This raises an interesting question 
about who is responsible for the accuracy of the map. 
In conventional mapping there is a sign-off where the 
relevant manager in the organisation confirms the 
map is acceptable, but who would accept 
responsibility for the accuracy of a map produced by a 
committee of vehicles being driven by software? 
While this level of detailed mapping might be 
practicable for a Level 4 AV operating in a restricted 
area, it is difficult to see how it could be maintained 
for Level 5 vehicles operating over several countries, 
which is why some companies, like Tesla, have 
avoided this approach. However, they would still need 
a map for guidance. The European map data for a 
present-day navigation system is around 20 Gigabytes 
(GB), which takes half an hour to download from the 
internet and an hour to install.13 
At present the largest AV developers have their own 
mapping systems. Alphabet’s mapping competence is 
seen as a major advantage for Waymo, its AV 
subsidiary (Alphabet owns Google Maps, Google 
Earth, Google Street View and the navigation app 
Waze, which tracks real-time traffic). While operating 
in a single city, a unique mapping system is not a 
severe limitation, but the amount of data that would 
have to be transferred in a country-wide update 
makes it impracticable for unconstrained use. 
The Financial Times reports that Brian McClendon, the 
former head of Google Maps, believes that eventually 
detailed maps will not be needed because the cars 
will be more intelligent.14 This appears to be some 
way from the present strategy of Waymo, and moves 
the group closer to car manufacturers who are 
designing for a system in which safe operation is not 
dependent on map data. 
                                                          
13 Data for a 2016 Volvo XC60. 
14 Leslie Hook, ‘Driverless cars: mapping the trouble ahead’, 
Financial Times, 21 February 2018. 
Even if mapping data is not safety-critical in the sense 
that faulty data could directly cause a crash, it could 
still be important in overall system safety. The Bay 
Gateway, a link from the Heysham port to the M6 
avoiding Lancaster, has been in the Lancashire 
transport plan since 1948. In March 2013 the 
Secretary of State for Transport granted approval for 
construction, which started the following year. It was 
open for traffic in September 2016 and was officially 
opened by the Lord Lieutenant on 2 March 2017. A 
Volvo satnav map, updated in June 2017, did not 
include the new road. It is interesting to surmise how 
this oversight occurred. A hypothetical methodology 
would be: Lancashire County Council takes the ‘as 
built’ map data from the contractor and informs 
Ordnance Survey, which includes the road on a 
master map; a data acquisition company (one in each 
country of the 28 covered by the satnav data?) takes 
the data and sends it to a mapping contractor which 
prepares the map updates for the car manufacturer 
which are then available for download from their 
website – at least six different organisations. 
While an out-of-date map is merely an inconvenience 
when driving manually, what happens if an 
autonomous vehicle has an equally out-of-date map?  
In the Bay Gateway project, the N-bound slip road at 
M6 J34 has been moved almost 1 km north, there is a 
new bridge across the River Lune, a dual carriageway 
parallel to the M6 for several hundred metres and 
several new roundabouts. Many of the existing roads 
have been changed significantly and road numbering 
has been altered. If an AV were navigating solely by 
the map, it would become lost. In this case, would it 
have the intelligence to abandon the map and read 
the road signs? 
This train of thought leads to a number of questions in 
relation to liabilities: 
1. Some existing AVs need highly detailed and 
accurate mapping, but when more intelligent 
vehicles could use more basic geographic 
data, would they still need an up-to-date map 
to navigate complicated road layouts safely? 
2. If the lack of an up-to-date map causes a 
vehicle to become confused, does it just keep 
going along any old road and hope it will find 
its way later, or does it stop and ask for help? 
If so, from whom? And if several dozen 
vehicles (from the same supplier and/or with 
the same map software) all become confused 
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in the same place at much the same time and 
all take the same course of action, how would 
the resulting traffic jam be untangled and by 
whom?  
3. Who is responsible for ensuring the map in 
a car is updated? Assuming it is a chain of 
bodies (as above) how many of them would 
be prepared to accept responsibility in the 
event of an accident (or, more likely, severe 
traffic congestion) caused by an out-of-date 
map or do they all discharge the responsibility 
via terms and conditions – if so, onto whom, 
and will the law permit the responsibility to 
be passed? 
4. What criteria does an AV use to decide to 
abandon its internal map and navigate by 
road signs or dead reckoning? Does it have 
the intelligence to recognise when a road sign 
has been moved, either inadvertently or ‘for a 
bit of a laugh’? 
5. How often do maps need to be updated? If 
it is once a week and each of 10 million AVs 
downloads ‘only’ 20 GB/update, that is a lot 
of data. Which body is responsible for 
managing the network? 
6. If an AV misses a map update (perhaps the 
operator leaves it in a garage while overseas 
for a month) is it still allowed on the roads? If 
an update agency ceases to exist or suffers a 
major computer failure (ransomware, loss of 
supply?), does that mean that all vehicles 
using that system are prohibited from 
travelling? 
An alternative sometimes discussed is that a vehicle 
does not carry an up-to-date map in memory but 
downloads it in real time from the fixed 
infrastructure. This could bring other complications, 
one of the more significant of which is that the 
Highways Agency (or whoever is responsible for the 
road in question) might acquire legal responsibility for 
some types of accident or major congestion involving 
AVs. And failure of the local infrastructure, possibly 
due to a cyber-attack or a local failure of the 
electricity system, could potentially immobilise 
thousands of vehicles. At present, there does not 
seem to be a well-thought-out solution to, what is 
admittedly, a long-term problem. 
 
Road signs  
All vehicles are expected to comply with speed limits 
and road signs; most of these are permanent but 
many are temporary for road maintenance, floods or 
to cope with accidents. Human drivers observe fixed 
roadside signs, electronic signs, and other indications.  
The 1968 UNEC Convention on Road Signs and Signals 
defined, in broad outline, the principles to be adopted 
internationally for road signs. Subsequently the Inland 
Transport Committee (ITC) of the Economic 
Commission for Europe organised another agreement 
to supplement the Vienna Convention (document 
E/ECE/812-E/ECE/TRANS/566) which provides greater 
detail. 
Despite these standardisation efforts, there are many 
situations where a country introduces road signs that 
are not precisely defined in these treaties. For 
example, in France, a speed limit sign is not displayed 
at the start of a built-up area but an official sign 
indicating a town is taken as the start of the 50 km/h 
urban speed limit; Volvo’s traffic sign information (TSI) 
system, which has a camera to read road signs, fails to 
recognise this information. This is one example, 
experienced by the author; there are likely to be many 
similar potential situations. For a manually-driven car 
this is not a problem, because the driver is responsible 
for understanding and complying with the speed 
limits and the dashboard indication is a ‘reminder’, 
but an AV could not rely on a system with that defect. 
Some cars have a speed limit advisory system that is 
programmed into the satnav. In September 2017, a 
nearly new Mitsubishi people carrier (in which the 
author was a passenger) going through the roadworks 
on the M60, where large 40 mph temporary speed 
limit signs were prominently displayed, showed a 
speed limit of 70 mph on the dashboard display, 
oblivious of the temporary signage. 
Even when a speed limit recognition system is 
effective on a plain road, it is often confused at 
junctions. Western Avenue in London is a large 
thoroughfare with a speed limit of 40 or 50 mph. 
Many of the residential side roads have 20 or 30 mph 
speed limits. A TSI system is easily confused if a lower 
limit sign is a few degrees out of alignment. A human 
driver travelling at 50 mph in a steady stream of 
traffic would ignore an unexpected indication. 
Whether an automatic system could do likewise is less 
certain and a sudden brake application in a dense, fast 
stream of traffic could have serious consequences. It 
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also conflicts with Article 17, s1 of the Vienna 
convention, which states that ‘No driver of a vehicle 
shall brake abruptly unless it is necessary to do so for 
safety reasons’. This raises the issue of liability for 
inadequate signage. At present, a partially obscured 
speed limit sign can be used by a driver as a reason to 
avoid a speeding conviction, but there is no record of 
councils being held liable for an accident caused by a 
car driving too fast after passing an obscured or 
misplaced sign. It is the driver’s responsibility to drive 
at a safe speed, irrespective of the speed limit. Would 
this still be the case if an AV were relying on signage? 
Software complexity and validation  
Software integrity can be ensured for relatively 
straightforward functions, such as railway signal 
interlocking, nuclear power control or aircraft fly-by-
wire systems, by using rigorous (and expensive) 
formal design methods. The software on manually-
driven cars can run to 100 million lines of code. 
Although some may by written using formal design 
methods, other software uses less rigorous 
techniques and the introduction of errors is 
unavoidable. AVs will be much more complicated. 
Realistically, the complete software on an AV will 
have thousands of faults – most, hopefully, not 
serious. (It could be hundreds of times more 
complicated than consumer products, such as 
Windows 10, and probably built by more than a dozen 
different organisations – all protecting their 
intellectual property.) Testing cannot be definitive: 
testing for all possible combinations of potential 
failure modes would take a large team many decades 
or even centuries. The most prevalent faults may be 
picked-up in tests, but there will be many others that 
only become obvious faced with a particular sequence 
of events. While the software in reactor control 
systems or railway signalling systems in each revision 
is fixed and the outcomes are deterministic, much AV 
software uses artificial intelligence (AI) where the car 
learns from its experience and, in effect, rewrites its 
own code. This cannot be validated by the same 
techniques as deterministic software. Establishing the 
safety integrity of AI systems is an active research 
area with an uncertain timescale. 
Data on manually driven cars shows a safety 
performance of just over 1 fatality per billion km.15 
                                                          
15 Professor Martyn Thomas, Is Society Ready for Driverless cars?, 
Lecture at Gresham College, 24 October 2017. 
Research published by the Rand Corporation 
concludes:16 
‘The results show that autonomous vehicles 
would have to be driven hundreds of millions 
of miles and sometimes hundreds of billions 
of miles [under realistic traffic conditions] to 
demonstrate their reliability in terms of 
fatalities and injuries. Under even aggressive 
testing assumptions, existing fleets would 
take tens and sometimes hundreds of years to 
drive these miles – an impossible proposition 
if the aim is to demonstrate their 
performance prior to releasing them on the 
roads.’ (Italics in the original) 
This leaves a difficult situation in terms of assuring the 
safety of some types of AVs and, particularly, CAVs. 
On one hand, the formal structured programming 
techniques that can give confidence that accidents are 
‘designed out’ have never been used on a system as 
complicated as an AV. On the other hand, 
demonstrating safety by test running would be 
extremely expensive and could take decades, even 
with large test fleets. 
Software updates  
Anyone with a Windows computer will be aware of 
the screen message ‘Working on updates. Don’t turn 
off your computer. This will take a while.’ Similar 
updating processes will be essential for AVs. There 
have been situations when experience in the field has 
indicated a Windows update has had unforeseen 
effects, which Microsoft has issued another update to 
correct. For PC operating systems, a problem of this 
sort could have economic effects but is unlikely to 
have serious safety consequences as, in general, 
Windows computers are not used in safety-critical 
applications. The same is not true of aerospace, 
nuclear and rail applications where computers are 
used in real-time control systems and where a failure 
could have serious consequences. 
A Eurostar cross-channel train uses a duplicated 
network of 38 computers for train management. Data 
transmitted includes power demand, train direction, 
raising and lowering the pantograph, operation of 
country-specific external steps, air conditioning 
settings, availability of water in the toilets, and dozens 
more functions. However, the safety-critical 
                                                          
16 Nidhi Kalra and Susan M. Paddock, How Many Miles of Driving 
Would It Take to Demonstrate Autonomous Vehicle Reliability? (The 
Rand Corporation, 2016), 10. 
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emergency braking demand was also transmitted by 
modulating pressure in a pneumatic pipe so, even if 
the electronics failed totally, it is still possible for the 
driver to apply the brakes. 
During the development of the train, a ‘Laborame’ 
(Labo = laboratory, rame = train, in French) was set up 
in Alstom’s Stafford Research Centre.17 This hardware 
allowed the data network to be tested faster than real 
time and with thousands of potentially conflicting 
data messages and imposed fault conditions. The 
quality procedures were adapted from those used on 
Sizewell B nuclear power station and in military 
aerospace systems. They required that, every time a 
software module was updated, the module in 
question was subjected to a detailed test and then 
inserted into the Laborame for tests to ensure its 
compatibility with other functions. This made the 
development less rapid than might otherwise have 
been the case but much more reliable. The network 
went into service with far fewer faults than simpler 
systems on previous projects. 
The Eurostar train management network was a very 
simple deterministic control system that did not 
include the safety-critical emergency brake function. 
In comparison, the systems on an AV will be perhaps 
1,000 times more complex and many would be able to 
cause a fatal accident. Validating the original control 
systems will be a major exercise that will probably use 
software analysis, laboratory simulation (similar in 
principle to the Laborame) and extensive operational 
trials. The process will not be quick and will be 
expensive. It is likely that, only once the control 
system is fully validated and demonstrated to be safe, 
would European regulatory authorities be prepared to 
allow an AV to be used unsupervised on the road. For 
a connected autonomous vehicle (CAV) it is likely that 
the equivalent to the Laborame stage would have to 
include aspects of the fixed infrastructure, for V2I 
systems or of any alternative manufacturers’ vehicles, 
for V2V applications. 
This raises the question of updating. Users of 
Windows 10 will know that it receives updates at least 
once a month, with a major update once or twice a 
year. During the early years of AV operation, 
manufacturers will find many ways in which the 
control systems could be improved and will identify 
dozens of possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities. It is 
unlikely that the update intensity will be much less 
                                                          
17 At the time, the author was Directeur du Project of the consortium 
designing and building the Eurostar trains. 
than for Windows. If a similar update procedure is 
used to other areas in the transport sector, each 
update will need to be fully validated, using much the 
same process as for the initial system. This would 
represent a major workload with significant cost and 
timescale implications.  
What are the implications of a software update not 
being installed? If an AV operator leaves a vehicle in a 
garage for a couple of months without installing any 
updates, would it still be legal to operate? If not, 
would the regulatory system rely on human 
intervention to prevent its use or would there be 
some form of remote inhibit? The latter would 
provide a tempting feature for cyber-criminals as well 
as possibly leaving users stranded. And where would 
the liability rest, in the event of an accident that may 
have been caused by a failure to install an update? 
There is an important question about who would be 
responsible for validating both the original software 
and the updates. In the UK civil nuclear industry, the 
Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) employs 
inspectors who can evaluate the safety case 
submissions made by firms operating on the 36 UK 
regulated sites. The safety cases include evidence of 
software validation and, where critical software is 
changed, the safety case has to be updated and 
revalidated. If the government decides to implement 
a similar methodology, one might see an Office for 
Autonomous Vehicle Regulation (OAVR). The 
workload would be considerably greater than for the 
ONR, which employs 500 staff, as the software is 
much more complicated and incorporates AI elements 
– almost unknown in existing safety-critical systems. 
Accident Investigation  
The complexity of AV control software and the 
difficulty of safety assurance presents a particular 
challenge for accident investigators. With manually-
driven cars, many driving decisions rely on a driver’s 
judgement. If a car emerges from a side turning into 
the path of a truck that is unable to stop in time, 
investigators may ask for evidence of the driver’s 
intoxication level, eyesight and general health and, 
unless these identify an obvious reason, the accident 
is put down to unanalysable ‘poor judgement’. AVs 
are different. ‘Judgement’ on whether to drive out of 
a side turning will be taken by a multitude of sensors 
and software packages. All of these can be analysed to 
see where the fault lies. An investigation that, for a 
manual car, would take an accident investigator a few 
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hours for an AV could be replaced by a forensic 
software analysis taking a large team many months. 
If AVs become widely adopted, there could be dozens 
of accidents a day in which the vehicle or its 
associated infrastructure systems are potentially 
implicated. In how many administrations would it be 
acceptable for the regulatory authorities to say ‘It 
seems the fatal accident was caused by a lack of 
judgement in the vehicle software, but we are not 
investigating further’? 
The only way of determining what caused an accident 
in a software-controlled vehicle is to interrogate the 
software, post incident. This raises the questions of 
who can obtain access to the software, whether the 
evidence is destroyed by being accessed, and how 
trustworthy the evidence is. Mason and Stanfield18 
define the term ‘trustworthiness’ as describing 
‘that a thing deserves, or is entitled to, trust 
or confidence. There are two qualitative 
dimensions to the concept of trustworthiness: 
reliability and authenticity. Reliability is meant 
to demonstrate that the record is capable of 
standing for the facts to which it attests. 
Authenticity means the record is what it 
claims to be.’ 
The evidence necessary to investigate the reasons for 
an accident involving an AV could include video 
records, data streams from radar and lidar sensors, 
timed records of speed, acceleration, steering angle, 
power and brake demand and similar inputs to and 
outputs from the AV decision-making process. In 
addition, the accident investigator would also require 
records of how the control system was interpreting 
these data and what might be described as ‘the 
thought process’ within the vehicle. The first group of 
data is reasonably easy to define and, given the right 
software, to interpret. These data should be reliable if 
the recording process has been working effectively, if 
calibration records are available and if precautions 
have been taken to prevent overwriting of data. 
Authenticity can be proved if the records are 
appropriately date and location stamped and if the 
data store has been locked to prevent corruption. 
There may be grounds for regulators to insist that AVs 
carry a sealed ‘flight recorder’ like aircraft so these 
                                                          
18 Stephen Mason and Allison Stanfield, ‘Authenticating electronic 
evidence,’ Chapter 7 in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng, eds, 
Electronic Evidence (4th edition, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
for the SAS Humanities Digital Library, School of Advanced Study, 
University of London, 2017), 7.1. 
data can be analysed by someone external to the 
design organisation. 
 It is the second group of records that is more 
problematic. Video records from the first group of 
data may show unambiguously that an AV pulled out 
of a side turning into the path of a truck which then 
ran into it. They will not show why the AV performed 
this manoeuvre. There may be records of ‘the thought 
process’ but this is unlikely, unless the requirement to 
maintain such records is a contractual commitment of 
being allowed on the road. Even if the records exist, it 
is unlikely that many accident investigators would be 
able to make sense of them. If a power station system 
has a deterministic control function implemented in a 
few hundred lines of a language such as C++, many 
independent investigators would be able analyse how 
it worked and how it might have failed. An image 
analysis programme designed to extract the message 
‘approaching truck, direction XYZ, velocity V’ from a 
video stream is much less easy to analyse. If the 
message about the approaching truck is 
supplemented by data streams from radars and lidars 
and analysed by an AI programme, it is unlikely that 
even the system designers would be able to ascertain 
exactly how the decision to cross the truck’s path was 
taken. 
Under most safety regulatory regimes, it would be 
unacceptable for important parts of an accident 
investigation to be undertaken by the party 
responsible for the system design, because of the 
conflict of interest, but it is not obvious how an AV 
equivalent of the Air Accidents Investigation Board 
(AAIB) would be able to find out what happened. 
This brings us back to the question raised earlier: 
Will it be acceptable for the regulatory 
authorities to say ‘It seems the fatal accident 
was caused by a lack of judgement in the 
vehicle software, but we are not investigating 
further’? 
 If this is not an acceptable response to an accident, 
what other options are there? 
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism  
A fleet of autonomous vehicles provides an attractive 
intellectual challenge for computer hackers and, more 
significantly, for cybercriminals: the possibility of 
affecting thousands of vehicles across the country, 
and thus spreading chaos, in which other crimes may 
be committed, would be particularly attractive. Any 
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system that requires regular wireless updates and 
where an external body has the power to disable a 
transport system remotely offers an open door for 
cybercrime. 
Many traditional infrastructure systems, such as the 
electricity grid, have a supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system to control equipment 
remote from the control room. Often these systems 
use proprietary data protocols and are not connected 
to the internet or other publicly accessible systems. 
Attacking them remotely is difficult. 
By contrast, CAVs are expected to use standard 
internet communications and to be fully integrated 
into the data environment. The KPMG report 
mentioned earlier,19 which seems to be the 
government’s reference point for AV policy, estimates 
a 12 per cent increase in internet traffic due to AVs 
and says: 
‘Connected and autonomous vehicles will 
generate vast amounts of data if consumers 
choose to share it. This has the potential to 
open up a range of opportunities for 
consumer engagement and indeed 
monetisation for the data owner. This will 
become a source of competitive advantage 
for OEMs, technology companies and insurers 
as well as supporting automated traffic flow 
management.’ 
With that level of integration into commercial data 
networks, there will be few impenetrable barriers to a 
determined cybercriminal. Traditionally, car crime has 
been about stealing either complete vehicles or their 
contents. Because of the likely ownership models and 
the need for various levels of approval and 
certification to operate autonomously, it is unlikely 
that there will be a ready market for stolen AVs. 
However, if AVs develop as mail order couriers, 
criminals might find it profitable to hack into the data 
systems to divert the goods to other addresses. 
Alternatively, if there is a development in AV 
chauffeur services for young children from affluent 
families, more aggressive criminals might find AVs a 
potential source of profitable kidnaps. 
It is cyberterrorism, rather than cybercrime, that is 
the greater cause for concern. The ability suddenly to 
disable only 5 per cent of the vehicles on Britain’s 
motorways would cause serious disruption; the 
                                                          
19 Connected and Autonomous Vehicles – The UK Economic 
Opportunity (March 2015, kpmg.co.uk), 14. 
effects of a virus to cause suicidal acceleration would 
be far worse. Reprogramming a few thousand vehicles 
to head for Trafalgar Square could clog central London 
for days, and it seems there would be little to stop a 
terrorist using an AV to deliver an explosive device to 
its target. It is possible that the police or security 
services would ask for some electronic means of 
intercepting AVs to force them to stop in these 
circumstances but, this would also provide a 
‘backdoor’ for criminals to access the vehicle control 
systems. 
It is not clear which body could take overall 
responsibility for preventing AV-enabled cybercrime 
and cyberterrorism. Possibly the regulatory, approvals 
and licencing regime for AVs could require 
manufacturers to demonstrate strong barriers against 
cyberattack. For CAVs which rely on subsystems 
developed and operated by several parties, this may 
be a defining role for a systems authority. The defined 
role and technical competences of the AV regulator 
will be important. 
How safe is safe enough?  
People, not technical failures, cause a large 
proportion of accidents. Data from the railways, air 
transport, oil refineries and chemical works show that 
around half of all accidents are attributable, at least in 
part, to human factors. For road transport, research 
indicates that around 94 per cent of accidents can be 
attributed to human error.20 If the analysis includes 
incidents that do not include injuries (such as body 
panels damaged by contact with trees, gateposts, 
walls and other fixed structures) the proportion could 
be higher. 
However, this does not mean that eliminating human 
input will necessarily reduce the number or severity of 
accidents. In Level 3 and below, a competent, certified 
(and sober) driver has to be available at all times, 
ready to take over when the control system decides it 
cannot cope. This is likely to be at the times that are 
most challenging for drivers, such as through complex 
roadworks at night. If the driver of a Level 3 vehicle 
only accumulates driving experience under these 
circumstances, it is probable that the intervention will 
be more stressful and their accident rate will be far 
higher than for a more experienced driver in a manual 
                                                          
20 US Department of Transportation; National Traffic Highway Safety 
Administration: Critical Reasons for Crashes Investigated in the 
National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (DOT HS 812 115 
A, February 2015). 
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car. If drivers are expected to intervene in an 
emergency or in unanticipated conditions, how will 
they gain and maintain the competence to do so? A 
complementary question is what the driving test 
should consist of for someone who has no experience 
of traditional driving but expects to be in charge of a 
Level 3 autonomous vehicle. If the driver of a Level 3 
vehicle is required to intervene only after the vehicle 
has put itself in an untenable position, such as on the 
wrong side of a barrier in road works, does he carry 
the liability for anything that goes wrong in 
attempting to rectify the situation? 
Reducing the number of road accidents is a desirable 
outcome. However there is a question whether the 
general public would be as forgiving of accidents 
caused by an automated vehicle as they are of 
‘human error’ events. Most opinion-formers are also 
car drivers and, other than in cases of gross 
irresponsibility, tend to be forgiving of errors they 
might have committed themselves. 
In the 1980s, when the initial London Docklands Light 
Railway21 was being commissioned, an 
overenthusiastic junior engineer drove a train over 
the end of the Island Gardens elevated section. There 
was a huge furore, focusing on the fact that it was an 
automatic railway – the fact that the train was being 
driven manually and the auto-drive system was not 
operational was ignored. It soon became obvious that 
the safety standards expected by the press and public 
of an automatic system are far more stringent than 
those of a manual system. While figures of 1,732 road 
deaths and 22,137 serious injuries (2015 figures for 
the UK)22 are broadly accepted by the public, it is 
doubtful that similar statistics be acceptable for AVs. 
Regulating safety 
Different transport modes have different safety 
regulatory regimes. UK railways have to comply with 
The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems 
(Safety) Regulations 2006 (2006 No. 599) as amended; 
air travel in Europe has to comply with the European 
Aviation Safety Agency regulations, etc. 
There is no obvious reason why the safety standards 
for AVs should be dramatically different to those for 
automatic railways or for industrial autonomous robot 
systems which, in the UK, are covered by the Health 
                                                          
21 The author was systems engineering manager of the main 
contractor. 
22 Department for Transport, Reported road casualties in Great 
Britain: main results 2015 (June, 2016). 
and Safety at Work Act. In the decade that the Health 
and Safety Executive was directly responsible for 
railway safety (from the Railways Act 1993 to the 
Railways Act 2005), the ALARP criterion (reducing risks 
to as low as reasonably practicable) was applied to 
individual subsystems of a train (which, incidentally, 
made the stabilisation and validation of any design 
very complicated, expensive and time-consuming). A 
similar philosophy has never been applied to 
manually-driven cars, but could be applied to 
automatic driving systems. The implications of a 
safety policy of this type on AVs would have a 
significant effect on their development. However, 
from a logical point of view, it would be justified as it 
is debatable whether the public (and the media) 
would be more forgiving of deaths caused by an 
automatic system on the roads, rather than an 
automatic system on the railways or in industry. It is 
difficult to make a consistent argument why road 
deaths should be treated more leniently than others. 
Who is responsible?  
The foregoing sections have raised several critical 
areas where the responsibility for safe operation of 
AVs could be ambiguous. The current phase of 
development where the only AVs running in any 
particular city are those constructed, maintained, 
operated and underwritten by one of the large US 
tech firms is unlikely to be representative of a future 
situation. If AVs are introduced widely in Europe, it is 
likely there will be several competing designs. If CAV 
technology takes off, as appears to be UK government 
policy, different makes of vehicles will have to work 
together and with infrastructure systems owned by a 
variety of private and public sector organisations. 
It is inevitable that there will be accidents – whether 
more or fewer that with manually-driven cars cannot 
be ascertained with confidence until a large fleet of 
AVs has been in service for many years. 
For accidents involving self-contained AVs, and for 
some accidents involving CAVs the cause will be 
readily attributable to particular component parts of 
an AV’s anatomy and thus to a particular supplier or 
design authority. In other situations, particularly if 
V2V and V2I interconnectivity are developed, it will be 
less clear what happened and where responsibility 
lies. It could be due a fault within the CAV, with part 
of the roadside infrastructure or with external data 
coming from other parties. There are likely to be 
situations where all subsystems are working as 
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designed but, when brought together, they result in a 
‘system fault’ for which none of the subsystem design 
authorities could be held responsible. 
To manage the interactions between different parties 
involved in AV development requires an organisation 
that is the systems authority or systems architect. 
Bearing in mind the level of technical competence 
needed by such a body, the necessary independence 
from other participants and the potential liabilities if 
there is a systems fault (such as on a computer-linked 
consist of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) running at 
speed on a motorway), there may be few, if any, 
organisations that could (and would be prepared to) 
take on that role. 
The complexity of AVs and of their software means 
that a detailed forensic analysis of an accident would 
require a large team of people who are fully 
conversant with that particular vehicle’s operating 
software. Realistically, this will only be available in the 
manufacturer’s design teams, and so an independent 
analysis of the causes of accidents, as is undertaken 
on conventional transport systems, is unlikely to be 
possible. 
The introduction of fully autonomous (Levels 4 and 5) 
vehicles into the market-based road transport system 
will change drastically the liabilities of different bodies 
involved. Politicians and safety regulators will need to 
have a very clear view of responsibilities and liabilities 
before operation beyond tightly-controlled prototype 
fleets is contemplated. 
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